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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I.

Introduction

On March 5, 1991, defendant William Marley III, a
member of the Enterprise Fire Company, a volunteer fire company
in the Borough of Hatboro, Pennsylvania, set fire to and
destroyed plaintiff John D. Mark's automobile repair business.
The question on this appeal is whether the Borough and Enterprise
can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil
rights statute, for damages resulting from the arson.

The

district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment,

basing the decision on its finding that Enterprise was not a
state actor for section 1983 purposes, and that it operates
independently of the Borough.

We conclude that the district

court erred in holding that Enterprise is not a state actor.
Nonetheless, our review of the record compels the conclusion that
the defendants cannot be held responsible under section 1983 for
the harm that occurred.1

We, therefore, will affirm the grant of

summary judgment.

II.

Factual background and procedural history

Enterprise is a private association of volunteers which
has served the Borough of Hatboro since 1890.
Hatboro, 856 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

Mark v. Borough of
In its day to

day operations, Enterprise essentially acts autonomously; it owns
the fire station and the fire fighting equipment, elects its own
officers, prepares its own budget and maintains its own
recruitment and training practices.

However, on September 28,

1987, Enterprise signed an agreement with the Borough, agreeing
to provide fire protection services to the Borough in return for
the latter's imposition of a fire tax.

The Borough insures

Enterprise's equipment, and the fire tax funds Enterprise's
operations and expenditures.

Id. at 973-74.

According to Enterprise's by-laws (as of June
16, 1989), "[a]ny person shall be eligible to
1

. Of course, we can affirm on a ground on which the district
court did not rely but which was raised before it. See Neely v.
Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 1988).

be a regular member of the Company if they
are eighteen (18) years of age or older and
they are of good moral character."
Enterprise Fire Company of Hatboro,
Pennsylvania By-Laws at app. 59.

The by-laws

provide the following procedure for admitting
an applicant to membership:

(1)

An

application for regular member [sic] must be
made in writing on forms provided by
[Enterprise].

The applicant must submit the

completed form co-signed by a regular member
in 'good standing' who shall be considered
the 'proposing member'.

A fee of three

($3.00) dollars shall accompany the
application.
(2) The Membership Committee shall be in
charge of membership and they shall be
responsible for the production, distribution
and receipt of completed application forms
and fees.
(3) Following the submission of the
completed application and payment of the fee
the Membership Committee shall arrange for
the applicant and proposing member to attend
the next regular membership meeting when both
parties are available.
(4) The applicant and proposing member shall
appear at the regular membership meeting at
which time the Membership Committee shall
introduce the applicant to the regular
membership. The application shall then be
referred to the Membership Committee for an
investigation and recommendation for
'probationary membership'.

(5) At the subsequent regular membership
meeting the Membership Committee shall report
on the application. If a 'favorable report'
is submitted than [sic] the regular
membership shall vote to determine whether
the applicant shall be accepted for
'probationary membership.' Said vote shall
be made by the show of hands and three (3) or
more negative votes shall be necessary to
defeat the application . . . .
By-laws at app. 59-60.

The application is a two-page

questionnaire that asks, among other things, whether the
applicant has "every [sic] been under the care of or committed to
any institution for any nervous condition, mental illness,
alcoholism or use of drugs."

App. 1-2.

Marley filled out and signed the application on May 9,
1986, and answered "no" to the foregoing question.

Id.

On May

19, 1986, Enterprise made him a probationary member, and it
appears that in May, 1988 he became a regular member.

Id. at 1.2

It is undisputed that prior to the Mark fire, Enterprise "never
considered the need for psychological testing to identify
firefighters having a propensity to commit arson. . . .

Neither

did it receive any advice as to whether existing members or
applicants for firefighter status could be identified as
potential arsonists."

Brief of Enterprise Fire Company at 10.

According to Mark's interpretation of expert reports, however,
Marley had a psychologically troubled background which would have

2

. The delay between Marley's probationary membership and
regular membership apparently was due to the fact that Marley
only turned 18 on May 3, 1988.

indicated to trained observers that he was not fit to be a
firefighter.

Additionally, while working as a volunteer

firefighter, Marley had a serious drinking problem and, on one
occasion, "was cautioned by other members to stay away from the
fire officers at the scene [of a fire] because he smelled so
strongly of alcohol."

Supplemental Statement of Dian Williams,

President of Center for Arson Research, July 11, 1993 at app.
946.
On December 23, 1992, Mark filed a complaint against
the Borough, several Borough officials, and Enterprise in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to recover his losses from the fire.3

His complaint

alleged that Enterprise's and the Borough's failure to follow
adequate policies to ensure that applicants to the fire
department were screened sufficiently for tendencies towards
arson caused the damage to his property.4

Mark claimed that this

duty to screen is compelled constitutionally, and that the danger
of volunteer firefighters committing arson is so grave and so
obvious that the defendants' failure to follow such a policy
evinced willful disregard for the rights of individuals with whom
the firefighters came in contact.

Mark further alleged that if

3

. The complaint also stated common law tort claims against
Marley but these claims are not before us on this appeal and we
do not address them.
4

. Mark also claims that the defendants had a duty to perform
periodic screenings of firefighters and to train firefighters to
identify potential arsonists in the company. We discuss all of
these claims under the rubric of "failure to screen."

Enterprise had a policy of psychologically screening applicants
or of training its firemen to spot potential arsonists, it would
have discovered that Marley was unfit to serve as a volunteer
firefighter and it never would have admitted him into membership,
so that Marley would not have started the fire.

Mark claimed

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law.

The

parties have considered the Borough officials on the same basis
as the Borough itself, and consequently we shall treat this case
as involving only two defendants, Enterprise and the Borough.5
On February 25, 1993, the Borough moved to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
1993, Enterprise made a similar motion.

On March 2,

On April 8, 1993, the

district court granted Enterprise's motion to dismiss counts 2
and 3, which alleged, respectively, negligence and willful and
wanton conduct, but the district court denied the remainder of
the motions.
On December 28, 1993, the defendants moved for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).

In their motion

papers, they made a series of alternative arguments, including
the following: (1) Enterprise was not a state actor for section
1983 purposes, and therefore Mark had no federal cause of action;
(2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no
duty upon local governments to provide adequate fire protection

5

. Mark did not specify whether he was suing the individual
defendants in their official or individual capacities.

or to protect the public from fire; (3) no local governmental
entity has a due process duty to protect the public against
violent acts of private persons; (4) even if Mark's
constitutional rights were violated, he failed to demonstrate
that the defendants' failure to screen applicants psychologically
for membership evinced deliberate indifference; (5) the causal
link between the failure to screen and the arson was too remote
to support the imposition of liability.
In an opinion and order dated June 30, 1994, reported
at 856 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the district court granted
defendants' motion.

The court first addressed the state actor

argument, and found that firefighting in Pennsylvania never has
been an exclusive function of the government, and that there is
an insufficient connection between the municipality and
Enterprise to justify imposing state actor status on Enterprise.
Id. at 970-76.

It went on to reason that "[s]ince [the Borough]

has no control over [Enterprise's] employment practices in the
first place, and since [Enterprise's] acts do not fairly
represent official policy, the Borough's policy or lack of policy
regarding [Enterprise's] screening of new applicants is not
actionable under § 1983."

Id. at 976.

Upon dismissing the

federal claims against both the Borough and Enterprise, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims,
and thus it dismissed those claims without prejudice.
Mark filed a timely notice of appeal from the district
court's order.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1291, as the appeal is from a final order disposing of all claims
in the complaint.

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

We exercise plenary review over

the district court's grant of summary judgment.

Allegheny Int'l,

Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1423 (3d Cir.
1994).

Thus, "we must determine whether 'the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the moving party]
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"

Id. at 1423

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). As we recently described:
'[I]n applying this standard, "all inferences
must be drawn against the movant, . . . and
in favor of the nonmovant."' [FDIC v.
Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1994)]
(quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v.
City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir.
1988)). However, '"where the movant has
produced evidence in support of its motion
for summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot
rest on the allegations of pleadings and must
do more than create some metaphysical
doubt."' Id. (quoting [Petruzzi's IGA
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.,
998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 554 (1993)]).
Id. at 1423.

III.

Discussion

In cases involving the scope of liability under a
federal statute, it always is appropriate to begin with the
statutory language.
that:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
"By its terms, of course, the statute creates no substantive
rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere."

City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432 (1985) (plurality opinion).
Thus, "[t]o establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a
plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law."
1993).

Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.

Here, Mark claims that he was deprived of his substantive

due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

district court opinion focused principally on whether Enterprise
could be considered a state actor for section 1983 purposes.
That is where, then, we will begin our analysis.

A.

Is Enterprise a State Actor?

"Although a private [party] may cause a deprivation of
. . . a right, [it] may be subjected to liability under § 1983
only when [it] does so under color of law."

Flagg Bros., Inc. v.

Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733 (1978).

The

Supreme Court has clarified that "[i]n cases under § 1983, 'under
color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as
the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7, 86 S.Ct. 1152,
1157 n.7 (1966) (quoted in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749 (1982) [hereinafter "Lugar"]), and
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769-70
(1982).
follows:

The state action principle is stated succinctly as
"[A]t base, 'constitutional standards are invoked only

when it can be said that the [government] is responsible for the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'"

Edmonson v.

Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2089
(1991) [hereinafter "Edmonson"] (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777,
2785-86 (1982)) (alterations in original).

Put differently,

deciding whether there has been state action requires an inquiry
into whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of [Enterprise] so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786

(internal citation omitted).
The Supreme Court in varying circumstances appears to
utilize three discrete tests to determine whether there has been
state action.

See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising

Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993).

The first inquiry asks

whether "the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."

Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted).

Years ago, the Court applied this

test somewhat liberally, holding, for example, that a town owned
by a private company performs a public function and therefore is
a state actor, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507, 66 S.Ct.
276, 279 (1946), and that a private organization conducting preprimary elections for the purpose of sending its candidates to
the primary election, engaged in an exclusive public function.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953).

See also

Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486 (1966) (public park
could not be operated with racial restriction even when trustees
had no connection to city government).
However, the Court came increasingly to emphasize the
"exclusivity" aspect of the test, and rarely found that
plaintiffs had met that rigorous standard.

Thus, in Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974), the
Court held that a private utility company, extensively regulated
by the state, and apparently holding at least a partial monopoly
in its territory, did not act under color of state law, in part
because the state where the utility was engaged in business had
"rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services
is either a state function or a municipal duty."
S.Ct. at 454.

Id. at 353, 95

Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court

held that a private entity engaged in the education of
maladjusted high school students did not perform an exclusively
public function because "[the state's] legislative policy choice
[to fund the private school] in no way makes these services the

exclusive province of the State."

457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. at

2772; see also Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707,
710-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (private contractor providing state school
bus program at state expense not performing exclusive state
function).

In sum, the exclusive public function test rarely

could be satisfied.
The second discrete inquiry asks whether "the private
party has acted with the help of or in concert with state
officials."

McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council for

Graduate Medical Ed., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994).

Thus, in

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970),
the Court held that a conspiracy between a private party and a
state official to engage in unlawful discrimination constituted
action "'under color' of law for purposes of the statute."
at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1606.

Id.

Similarly, in Lugar a private party's

prejudgment attachment of another party's property, pursuant to a
state statute, constituted state action under section 1983.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42, 102 S.Ct. at 2756.
Finally, the third scenario involves situations in
which "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with . . . [the acting party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."
Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir.
1984) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 862 (1961)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015, 105
S.Ct. 2018 (1985) (alterations in original).

Burton was a

classic application of this symbiotic relationship test.

There,

the Court deemed a private restaurant's discriminatory act state
action because the restaurant was located in a building owned by
the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the state.
Because of the arrangement between the Parking Authority and the
restaurant, under which the State of Delaware benefitted
financially from its lessee's business, the Court held that
Delaware could be responsible for the restaurant's discriminatory
acts.

Burton, 365 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct. at 862.

Following the

reasoning in Burton, we have held that actions taken by the
University of Pittsburgh and Temple University constitute state
action because the universities "receive present financial
support [and] the state has committed itself to future financial
aid and sets an annual appropriation policy and tuition rate."
Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 102.6
In Edmonson, the Supreme Court clarified the Lugar
joint participation test and enunciated an approach that applies
to this case.

In cases such as this, courts must ask "first

whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the
6

. The Supreme Court, interpreting the symbiotic relationship
test, has commented that "while 'a multitude of relationships
might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace,'
differences in facts beget differences in law, limiting the
actual holding [of] Burton to lessees of public property."
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358, 95 S.Ct. at 457 (citation omitted). At
least one court has held that this language "limited the
symbiotic relationship analysis." Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 215.
We, however, have held that the Burton test remains a viable
framework for assessing state actor status. See Krynicky v.
University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d at 100-01; McKeesport Hospital
ACGME, 24 F.3d at 526 n.1 (Becker, J., concurring in judgment).

exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority; and second, whether the private party charged with the
deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor."
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620, 111 S.Ct. at 2082-83 (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).

In describing the second prong of

the test, the Court explained as follows:
Our precedents establish that, in determining
whether a particular action or course of
conduct is governmental in character, it is
relevant to examine the following: the
extent to which the actor relies on
governmental assistance and benefits, see
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961); whether the
actor is performing a traditional
governmental function, see Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946);
cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S.
522, 544-45, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (1987);
and whether the injury caused is aggravated
in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority, see Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22, 111 S.Ct. at 2083.7
Edmonson itself involved the question of whether
peremptory challenges removing jurors in civil cases constituted
7

. Edmonson inquires into whether the practice involved a
"traditional public function" rather than an exclusive
governmental function. While, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in
her dissenting opinion, the majority might have altered the
traditional public function test as a discrete test, the Edmonson
majority can be read to say that in conducting the joint
participation discrete test, whether the private actor performed
a traditional public function is one factor to consider. But see
Judge Greenberg's concurrence.

state action under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

After

weighing the relevant factors, the Court concluded (1) this was a
situation in which "private parties make extensive use of state
procedures with the 'overt, significant assistance of state
officials.'"

Id. at 622, 111 S.Ct. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa

Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486,
108 S.Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988)); (2) peremptory challenges involve
"[a] traditional function of government."

Edmonson, 500 U.S. at

624, 111 S.Ct. at 2085; (3) allowing race discrimination to
proceed with impunity in a courtroom "mars the integrity of the
judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government
from becoming a reality."
2087.

Edmonson, id. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at

Thus, the plaintiff's allegation that peremptory

challenges were discriminatory could properly be considered under
the Constitution.
We now consider whether Enterprise fairly can be found
to be a state actor.

Courts addressing the status of volunteer

fire companies in other jurisdictions have reached differing
results.

See, e.g., Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire

Co., 25 F.3d 1039 (table), 1994 WL 233356 (4th Cir. 1994)
(question of whether fire fighting is traditionally exclusive
government function in Maryland is question of fact); Haavistola,
6 F.3d at 218 (same); Yeager, 980 F.2d at 340-43 (volunteer fire
company in Texas not state actor); Janusaitis v. Middlebury
Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1979) (volunteer
fire department in Connecticut state actor); Versarge v. Township
of Clinton, No. 90-257, 1991 WL 247611 at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 18,

1991) (act of expelling member from New Jersey volunteer fire
company considered state action), aff'd on other grounds, 984
F.2d 1359 (3d Cir. 1993); Kronmuller v. West End Fire Co., 123
F.R.D. 170, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (disputed issues of fact existed
about whether volunteer fire company was state actor); Libin v.
Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Conn. 1985) (For
establishment clause purposes, "[t]he near 'symbiotic
relationship' between the Town and the Company requires the
conclusion that the Company is, in fact, a state actor.").

Of

course, since the question must be resolved by reference to the
particular local facts, by definition none of these cases is
controlling.
As noted above, the first question under Edmonson is
whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority.

This prong of the test "only asks whether the private

actor who caused the harm to another person was acting in
conformity with the law of the jurisdiction when he caused the
harm."

Rotunda & Nowak, § 16.1 at 527.

In other words, we ask,

under what authority did the private person engage in the
allegedly unlawful acts.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.

163, 92 S.Ct. 1965 (1972), provides a good illustration of how
this first prong of the inquiry is applied.

In that case, a

black plaintiff sued the Moose Lodge, a private fraternal
organization, alleging that the Lodge's refusal to serve him
alcoholic beverages violated his right to be free from racial
discrimination under the Constitution.

The plaintiff "claimed

that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued . . . Moose
Lodge a private club license that authorized the sale of
alcoholic beverages on its premises, the refusal of service to
him was 'state action' for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
1967.

Id. at 165, 92 S.Ct. at

The Court reasoned that because "the Pennsylvania Liquor

Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or
enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club that it
licenses to serve liquor," id. at 175, 92 S.Ct. at 1972-73, there
was no relationship between the relevant state policy and the
discrimination.

Thus, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first

prong of the test.
Here, however, the allegation of an unconstitutional
deprivation is related directly to the Borough's agreement with
Enterprise that the latter would be the official provider of fire
services in the Borough.

Pennsylvania law authorizes boroughs

"[t]o make regulations, within the borough, or within such limits
thereof as may be deemed proper, relative to the cause and
management of fires and the prevention thereof."
tit. 53, § 46202(21).

Pa. Stat. Ann.

Pursuant to this provision, on September

28, 1987, the Borough entered into an agreement with Enterprise
under which "[Enterprise] shall provide fire suppression and fire
protection within the corporate limits of the Borough" and
pursuant to which "[t]he [fire] chief shall be charged with the
responsibility of providing fire suppression and fire protection
and appropriate emergency assistance in accordance with
[Enterprise's] training and expertise as required within the

corporate limits of the Borough."

Agreement by Enterprise Fire

Company to Provide Fire Protection for the Borough of Hatboro
(hereinafter "Agreement"), at app. 169, 170.

Thus, the first

prong of the test is satisfied.
The second question under Edmonson requires us to
decide whether, all things considered, it is fair to hold that
Enterprise is engaged in state action.

As noted above, one

factor we consider is the extent to which the provision of fire
services is a traditional public function in Pennsylvania.

In

Jackson, the Supreme Court equated the question of whether
something is a public function with the question of whether the
particular state imposed a duty to perform the relevant function.
Jackson, 419 U.S. 353, 95 S.Ct. at 454.

In that case, the Court

refused to hold that providing utility services is state action
under the public function test, because "while the Pennsylvania
statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on regulated
utilities it imposes no such obligation on the State.

The

Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that furnishing
of utility services is either a state function or a municipal
duty."

Id. at 353, 95 S.Ct. at 454.

The question of whether

there is a municipal duty to provide the services, and thus,
whether fire protection is a governmental function, must be
answered in light of "the history, tradition and local law
surrounding volunteer fire departments."

Yeager v. City of

McGregor, 980 F.2d at 340.
We conclude that in Pennsylvania, the provision of fire
protection is a governmental function.

Pennsylvania courts

repeatedly have recognized, notwithstanding the permissive
language of the authorizing statute quoted above, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 53, § 46202(21), that volunteer fire companies are engaged
in a public function and that municipalities have a public duty
to provide fire protection.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

long ago said that "[t]he protection of the city from fire is a
municipal function of the highest importance."
Barker, 61 A. 253, 254 (Pa. 1905).

Commonwealth v.

In another case, the Court

opined that volunteer firemen are analogous to police officers,
and that volunteer fire companies were entitled to governmental
immunity:
It has been held in this state that the duty
of extinguishing fires, and saving property
thereupon is a public duty, and the agent to
whom such authority is delegated is a public
agent, and not liable for the negligence of
its employees. . . . The same reason which
exempts the city from liability for the acts
of its policemen, applies with equal force to
the acts of the firemen. And it would seem
from this and other cases to make no
difference, as respects to the legal
liability, whether the organization
performing such public service is a volunteer
or not.
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 556-57 (Pa. 1888) (emphasis
added).

Relying on these cases, the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania more recently concluded that "volunteer fire
companies, because of their distinct creation and present
relationship to municipalities, presently enjoy governmental
immunity."

Zern v. Muldoon, 516 A.2d 799, 805 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1986) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 541 A.2d 314 (Pa.
1988)).

The court reasoned:
This conclusion is supported by a recognition
that the functions and accomplishments of
volunteer fire departments affix to their
continued existence a public, governmental
character. The extensive statutory
legislation which enhances and directs the
organization of volunteer fire companies
demonstrates an adoption by the Commonwealth
and its citizenry of the governmental
characteristic of volunteer fire companies.
The charitable emphasis [of older cases] has
been replaced by the critical realization of
the need for continued public protection from
fire and the realization that a governmental
duty can be capably performed by mostly
volunteer organizations.

Zern, 516 A.2d at 805.

Even more recently, the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, interpreting a Pennsylvania statute providing
governmental immunity to governmental agencies, held that a
volunteer fire company is a local agency entitled to governmental
immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8541 (1982), and that
"governmental immunity [applies] even when they are not engaged
in fire-fighting activities."

Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 614

A.2d 218, 219, 220 (Pa. 1992).8
Enterprise argues that Guinn is inapplicable because a
holding that an entity is a governmental agency entitled to
governmental immunity under a local law is fundamentally distinct
8

. Guinn's holding has been interpreted to apply only to fire
companies that "(1) have been created pursuant to relevant law
and (2) that are legally recognized as the official fire company
for a political subdivision." Kniaz v. Benton Borough, 642 A.2d
551, 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). In this case there is no
question that both of these requirements have been met.

from a holding that a party is a state actor under section 1983.
Indeed, in Krynicky, we noted the distinction between government
agency status under state law and state actor status under
section 1983.

Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 103 n.12.

But whether an

entity is a state agency may, in certain cases, be relevant in
determining whether it is a state actor for section 1983
purposes.

Here, the rationale behind Guinn and the other cases

discussed above was that in Pennsylvania firefighting is a public
duty and a public function.

Thus, Guinn is certainly relevant to

our analysis.9
Moreover, an analysis of Pennsylvania courts' treatment
of volunteer fire companies in other situations leads inevitably
to the conclusion that volunteer fire companies in Pennsylvania
are state actors.

In Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. and Relief Ass'n

v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d 439 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania discussed whether a
volunteer fire company is an employer under Pennsylvania's Human
Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43 §, 954(b) (1991).

In the

course of its decision, the court discussed Janusaitis v.
Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 464 F. Supp. 288 (D. Conn. 1979)
9

. In Krynicky, we opined that "a state court construction of a
state statute has no bearing on whether an entity that is
connected with the state is a 'state actor' for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment and § 1983." 742 F.2d at 103 n.12. While
it is certainly true that a state court's determination that an
actor is private cannot bind a federal court's determination of
whether the action is nonetheless public, a state's converse
finding certainly has more weight.

(Janusaitis I), and Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire
Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (Janusaitis II), two opinions
addressing whether a volunteer fire company is a state actor
under section 1983.

In Janusaitis, the district court found that

the company was not a state actor, but the court of appeals
disagreed.

The Harmony court noted that "many of the

considerations involved in the present case are also a part of a
state action determination," see Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459
A.2d at 442-43, and rejected the reasoning of Janusaitis I.
Instead, it quoted the court of appeals' statement that "[f]ire
protection is a function public or governmental in nature . . .
which would have to be performed by the Government but for the
activities of volunteer fire departments."
Janusaitis II, 607 F.2d at 24).

Id. at 443 (quoting

The Harmony court continued: "We

concur with that statement and with the position of the
commission that the fire company's primary function, the
provision of fire and emergency services, is governmental in
nature."

Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 443.
Our conclusion is reinforced further by a Pennsylvania

appellate court's determination that a volunteer fire department
may be held liable under section 1983 for violating a plaintiff's
constitutional rights.

In that case, Tallon v. Liberty Hose Co.

No. 1, 485 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the plaintiff alleged
that a volunteer fire company "had denied her application for
membership solely on the basis of her sex," id. at 1211, and
claimed relief under section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
After the parties entered into a consent decree, the plaintiff

moved for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.10

Upon

finding that the company was unable to pay, the trial court
declined to award fees.

The Superior Court reversed, holding

that "an award of fees cannot be denied on the basis of
appellee's perceived inability to pay," and remanded the matter
for a determination of the proper amount of fees to be awarded.
Id. at 1214.
Under section 1988, in a section 1983 case a plaintiff
may receive an award of attorneys fees only if a prevailing
party, and the Tallon court noted that "we agree[] that appellant
met the requirements of the Act in that she was the prevailing
party in a section 1983 cause of action."

Id. at 1212.

In order

to prevail in a section 1983 cause of action, a party must
establish that the defendant acted under color of state law, or
was a state actor.

Therefore, in holding that the court could

award attorneys fees, the Superior Court necessarily believed
that the volunteer fire company was a state actor under section
1983.

Otherwise, it could not have awarded fees.
Importantly, our conclusion cannot be avoided by the

fact that Tallon involved interpretation of a consent decree,
10

.

This statute provides in pertinent part that:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

because in that decree the defendant expressly contended that it
violated no federal law.

See Tallon, 485 A.2d at 1211 (In the

consent decree, "Liberty Hose made no admission that it had
violated federal law."); id. at 1212 n.3 ("Appellee avers that
appellant's claim against appellee did not involve any right
guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States and
therefore she cannot recover counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988.").

The court nonetheless found "this argument to be

meritless."

Id.

Tallon is particularly significant because there, as
here, the volunteer fire company operated with much autonomy.
The consent decree provided that:
[A]ppellant would be admitted as a
probationary member of the hose company, and
if she fulfilled the probationary
requirements, which applied to all members,
she would be admitted as a permanent member.
The consent decree further stated that the
constitution and by-laws of the hose company
would be amended to specify that no person
would be rejected from membership on the
basis of gender.
Id. at 1211.

In other words, the company had its own by-laws,

its own constitution, and the authority to adopt its own policies
and regulations.
case.

The case at hand is indistinguishable from that

We therefore hold that as Enterprise, in accordance with

its agreement with the Borough, is "the duly appointed Fire
Company to service the Borough" and under applicable state law is
performing an exclusively governmental function.11
11

. The district court also relied on several treatises for the
proposition that firefighting generally, and in Pennsylvania in

Because Pennsylvania courts view firefighting as a
public duty and treat volunteer fire companies for all relevant
purposes as state entities, and because Enterprise is the duly
appointed fire company of the Borough, we probably could end our
analysis here.

We nonetheless continue to consider factors

relevant to the question of whether Enterprise is engaged in
state action.

We thus look at the extent to which Enterprise

relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Edmonson, and
the extent of the nexus between the state and the volunteer fire
company.

McKeesport Hospital, 24 F.2d at 526 (Becker, J.

(..continued)
particular, historically has been the province of private actors.
For instance, it states that "[i]n 1986, only 49 of the
Commonwealth's 2,550 fire departments were paid or partially paid
units. The remaining 2,501 were all-volunteer fire companies."
Mark, 856 F. Supp. at 973 (citing John Clements, Pennsylvania
Facts at 23 (1987)). In the first place, this fact does not
answer the question of whether these private companies are
performing a traditional governmental function, or whether a fire
company duly appointed by a municipality is essentially an arm of
the municipality. Second, Pennsylvania courts' treatment of the
issue is more significant than a single fact.
We are also aware that in Yeager, the court relied on
several treatises and newspaper articles for the proposition that
"there are a variety of private sector fire fighting
alternatives; and fire fighting is not generally an exclusive
government function." Yeager, 980 F.2d at 341. The problem with
this analysis is threefold. First, the Yeager court was supposed
to be inquiring into the history of the particular municipality,
not the general history of volunteer firefighting. Second, the
existence of private volunteer firefighting companies says
nothing about whether the State or the municipality has a public
duty to provide firefighting. Finally, the Yeager court
improperly applied the "exclusive public function" test. When
the question is whether the state can delegate a responsibility
and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is illogical to view the delegation of that very responsibility
as evidence that the responsibility can be delegated.

concurring in judgment).

We also consider the degree to which

the State has "exercised coercive power or has provided . . .
significant encouragement, either overt or covert."

Blum, 457

U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786.
"[T]he history, structure, organization and public duty
of volunteer fire companies distinguish them from any other
organization in existence in this Commonwealth today."

Temple v.

Milmont Fire Co., 525 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), appeal
denied, 533 A.2d 95 (Pa. 1987); Scrima v. Swissvale Area
Emergency Serv., 599 A.2d 301, 303 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(distinguishing volunteer fire companies from volunteer ambulance
associations, which only "provide an important service to the
community").

One court has explained the intertwining of the

state and volunteer fire companies in detail:
Numerous legislative enactments . . .
interweave the functioning of the government
and the fire company. Several statutes
provide the fire company with particular
benefits and powers: volunteer firefighters
may become special fire police with full
power to regulate traffic, control crowds and
exercise all other police powers necessary to
facilitate the fire company's work at a fire
or any other emergency; volunteer fire
associations are exempt from vehicle title
and registration fees; and fire companies are
eligible for low interest state loans in
order to purchase equipment. Other statutes
also recognize the intimate relationship
between a volunteer fire company and
governmental entities: the borough is liable
for the negligent operation of equipment by a
volunteer firefighter responding to an
emergency; an employer may not terminate a
volunteer firefighter for missing work while
responding to a fire call; firefighters are
government employees under the workmen's
compensation act; firefighter relief

associations are entitled to receive a two
percent tax on all foreign fire insurance
premiums; the borough may make regulations
for fire safety and may make appropriations
to fire companies; the state may regulate
relief companies; and the fire station is
exempt from property taxes.
Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 443.

Moreover,

Pennsylvania law prohibits municipalities from replacing
volunteer fire companies by paid companies "except by a majority
vote in a local referendum."

Temple, 525 A.2d at 851-52.

Its

agreement with the Borough provides Enterprise with still more
financial benefits.

Under it, "[t]he Borough agrees to provide

[Enterprise] sufficient funds for its operation and capital
expenditures by the imposition of a fire tax."
169.

Agreement at app.

By using funds obtained by the fire tax, the Borough may

purchase equipment or property for Enterprise, and Enterprise
will keep its equipment and facilities in good repair.
170-71.

Id. at

Further still, the Borough agrees to "maintain insurance

for [Enterprise] as regards to personal injury or property damage
from its general operating funds."

Id. at 171.

In exchange for taking over the municipality's public
duty, Enterprise is designated as the "duly appointed Fire
Company to service the Borough of Hatboro."
170.

Agreement at app.

Enterprise must "prepare and submit an annual budget to

Borough Council," which the Borough Council then decides whether
or not to approve.

The agreement further requires the Fire Chief

to attend meetings of the Borough Council and to "[p]rovide a
written report to Borough Council at the first regular council or

committee meeting of each calendar month as to the Company's
current status relating to operations within the Borough."

And,

directly pertinent to Mark's allegations of insufficient
screening and training, "[t]he fire chief and president of
[Enterprise] shall . . . [a]ssure that the operation of
[Enterprise's] personnel and equipment meets satisfactory
standards for fire prevention and control."
172.

Agreement at app.

Finally, we note that the individual act alleged to be

wrongful -- the method of electing firefighters -- is directly
related to the state-created duty to provide fire protection in
the first place.

See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007-08 & n.17, 102 S.Ct.

at 2787 & n.17.
It is apparent, then, that the Borough and Enterprise
are intertwined to a great extent, that Enterprise depends in
large part on the municipality for funding, and that through the
granting of benefits and the appointing of Enterprise as a "duly
appointed fire company," the Borough actively encourages it to
perform a municipal duty.

In the circumstances, we hold that

Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of this case.

B.

Was Mark deprived of a constitutional right?

The fact that Enterprise is a state actor does not end
our inquiry.

In order to prove a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff

must show that he or she was deprived of a constitutional right.
Mark bases his theory of liability against both defendants on
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018
(1978), and later cases building on Monell, holding that a

municipal entity may be liable when its policymakers made a
deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a
particular course of action, where the policy reflected
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the
municipality's inhabitants, and where the policy was the moving
force behind a constitutional violation.

Mark further predicates

his claim that there was a constitutional violation on the "state
created danger theory," which, in turn, derives from language
used in the Supreme Court opinion of DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989).

The

defendants contend that under several cases decided after Monell,
including DeShaney, Mark's claim must be dismissed.
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that "when execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury then the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983."
at 2037-38.

436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct.

Post-Monell cases often have reflected confusion

with the actual standard governing the imposition of liability,
but two subsequent Supreme Court cases have delineated those
situations more clearly.

In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989), the Court held that "the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability . . . where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact."

In that case, however, the Court "assume[d] that

respondent's constitutional right . . . was denied by city

employees," id. at 389 n.8, 109 S.Ct. 1205 n.8, and went on to
assess whether the failure to train ever could give rise to
municipal responsibility.

Thus, the case cannot be read to stand

for the proposition that a policy evincing willful disregard,
though not causing a constitutional violation, can be the basis
for section 1983 liability.

In short, City of Canton dealt with

responsibility for an assumed constitutional violation.
In Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112
S.Ct. 1061 (1992), the Court clarified still further the issue of
when a municipality may be liable.

In that case, the plaintiff's

decedent, a city employee, died of asphyxia after entering a
manhole.

The plaintiff claimed that her decedent "had a

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm
to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to be
protected from the City of Harker Heights' custom and policy of
deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees."
at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 1064.

Id.

The Court this time assumed that the

municipality was responsible for the injury and asked whether the
injury was of constitutional proportions.
focus from that in City of Canton.
into:

Thus, it reversed its

In so doing, it inquired

(1) whether "the Due Process Clause supports petitioner's

claim that the governmental employer's duty to provide its
employees with a safe working environment is a substantive
component of the Due Process Clause," id. at ____, 112 S.Ct. at
1069; and (2) whether "the city's alleged failure to train its
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an
omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or

conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense."
112 S.Ct. at 1070.

Id. at ____,

Reasoning that there was no affirmative

constitutional duty, and that the city's actions were not
conscience-shocking or arbitrary, a unanimous Court held that
there could be no section 1983 liability.

It did not matter

whether a policy enacted with deliberate indifference to city
employees caused the injury, because the injury could not be
characterized as constitutional in scope.
Thus, Collins made clear that in a Monell case, the
"proper analysis requires us to separate two different issues
when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality:

(1)

whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional
violation, and if so, (2) whether the city is responsible for
that violation."

Id. at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 1066; see also

Searles v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 791 (3d
Cir. 1993) (quoting Collins).
Against this backdrop, we first address whether Mark
can demonstrate that a constitutional injury was inflicted upon
him.

He claims that the defendants directly caused the harm by

creating the danger; in other words, he argues that "by cloaking
Marley with state authority to set fires, Defendants prompted him
to set fires he otherwise would not have set."
(citing Complaint).

Reply Br. at 4

The defendants respond by characterizing the

alleged constitutional violation as a failure to protect Mark
from the risk of arson committed by private citizens.

They then

argue that Collins and DeShaney foreclose Mark's theory of
constitutional injury.

We turn to DeShaney now.

In the Supreme Court's own words, the facts of DeShaney
were "undeniably tragic":

Although a Winnebago County Department

of Social Services caseworker knew of a number of suspicious
injuries to Joshua DeShaney, which strongly indicated that a
member of the child's household was severely physically abusing
him, the caseworker nonetheless took no action to protect the
child.

Soon thereafter, the child's father "beat 4-year-old

Joshua so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma
[after which] he suffered brain damage so severe that he is
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution
for the profoundly retarded."
S.Ct. at 1001-02.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193, 109

Nevertheless the Court unequivocally held that

states generally are under no affirmative duty to protect
citizens from torts committed by private individuals.

The Court

explained:
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State's power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of
safety and security. It forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty, or property without 'due process of
law,' but its language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation
on the State to ensure that those interests
do not come to harm through other means.
DeShaney, id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1003.

The Court held that no

constitutional right had been violated because, absent a special
relationship, "a State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the
Due Process Clause."

DeShaney, id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004.

There is a special relationship only in those limited

circumstances where the plaintiff is essentially in the
defendant's custody.

Thus, the Due Process Clause "requires the

State to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated
prisoners," who are unable to procure such care for themselves.
DeShaney, id. at 198, 109 S.Ct. at 1005 (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91 (1976)).
Similarly, states must "provide involuntarily committed mental
patients with such services as are necessary to ensure their
'reasonable safety' from themselves and others."

Id. at 199, 109

S.Ct. at 1005 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct.
2452 (1982)).

See also Collins (state had no constitutional duty

to protect employee from foreseeable risks at work); Searles v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d at 792 (the Constitution
"'[does not] impose[] a duty on SEPTA [, a passenger train line,]
to provide a safe passenger environment.'" (quoting Searles v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Civil Action Nos. 91-6687 & 921065, 1992 WL 150701, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992)).
As a preliminary matter, we reject Mark's attempt to
distinguish DeShaney by contending that Marley was a state actor
when he committed the arson.

Marley, the underlying active

tortfeasor, acted in a purely private capacity when he committed
the arson.

It is well settled that an otherwise private tort is

not committed under color of law simply because the tortfeasor is
an employee of the state.

Rather, in order for the tortfeasor to

be acting under color of state law, his act must entail "[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state

law."

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct.

1031, 1043 (1941); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809,
815-16 (3d Cir. 1994).
'pretense' of law.

"[U]nder color of law means under

Thus, acts of officers in the ambit of their

personal pursuits are plainly excluded.

Acts of officers who

undertake to perform their official duties are included whether
they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it."

Screws

v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040 (1945)
(plurality opinion).

See Barna, 42 F.3d at 815-16; Navarro v.

Otero de Ramos, 797 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D.P.R. 1992).

But even

"acts committed by a police officer . . . while on duty and in
uniform are not under color of state law unless they are in some
way 'related to the performance of police duties.'"

Briscoe v.

LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 721 n.4. (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v.
Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)), aff'd, 460 U.S.
325, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983).

As the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit has explained, if a person's actions "were not
'committed in the performance of any actual or pretended duty,'"
the actions were not committed under color of law.

Bonsignore v.

City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting
Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. at 937).

See, generally, Barna

42 F.3d at 815-17.
On this point, this case is not even close, unlike, for
example, cases in which police officers moonlight as security
guards and dress in their police uniforms.

See D.T. by M.T. v.

Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1190-91 (10th Cir.
1990) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct.

213 (1990).
fires.

Marley set a fire when his obligation was to put out

He apparently did it secretly, giving no one the

impression that he was acting on behalf of Enterprise.

While

Mark contends that Marley lit the fire so that he could put it
out, he points to no evidence in the record directly supporting
that proposition.

Moreover, even if the allegation is true, it

is not relevant in the circumstances here, as Mark does not
contend that the officers or indeed anyone else from Enterprise
knew that Marley intended to start the fire.

Marley clearly was

pursuing his own goals and was not in any way subject to control
by Enterprise when he started the fire.

Furthermore, it would be

bizarre to hold that inasmuch as Enterprise was in the "business"
of putting out fires, Marley furthered Enterprise's functions by
providing it with an opportunity to fight a fire.

In this case

the defendants did not abuse their authority and Marley was a
private actor when he caused the harm.

Thus, DeShaney certainly

applies, and the question becomes whether that case leaves open
the possibility of state liability when private actors commit the
underlying tort.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that in
DeShaney, the "Court's baseline [was] the absence of positive
rights in the Constitution and a concomitant suspicion of any
claim that seems to depend on such rights."

DeShaney, 489 U.S.

at 204, 109 S.Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

And when

the Court characterized "the DeShaneys' claim [as being] first
and foremost about inaction (the failure, here, of respondents to
take steps to protect Joshua)," id. (Brennan, J., dissenting),

the result became clear.

Thus, the proposition that "a State's

failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause," id.
at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004, does not necessarily preclude
liability where the harm -- though at the hands of a private
actor -- is the product of state action that legitimately can be
characterized as affirmative conduct.

Indeed, the DeShaney Court

explicitly noted that under the facts of that case, "[w]hile the
State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."

DeShaney,

id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006.
Several courts have interpreted this language to mean
that "[w]hen state actors knowingly place a person in danger, the
due process clause of the constitution . . . render[s] them
accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from their
conduct".

Johnson v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198,

199 (5th Cir. 1994); Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("If the state puts a man in a position of danger from
private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be
heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into the snake pit.").
For our part, we have yet to decide definitively
whether the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for
finding a constitutional injury.

In D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks

Area Vo. Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc),
cert. denied,

U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 1045 (1993), while we

analyzed the plaintiffs' claims under the state-created danger
theory, we consistently referred to the claim as "plaintiffs'
theory," only going so far as to acknowledge that other courts
have recognized the theory.

See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1373

("Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that this [state created danger]
claim exists apart from the claim based on the compulsory
attendance law."); id. at 1375 ("We now turn to the final two
cases cited by plaintiffs to support their theory of statecreated danger.") (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1114-16 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2827 (1991), we acknowledged that other
courts of appeals had applied the state created danger theory,
but we simply distinguished those cases on the facts.

Finally,

after noting in Searles v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth.
plaintiff's argument that "the injury [was] directly caused by a
state actor's affirmative act in the traditional sense," we
quickly concluded that, even assuming the viability of the
theory, the facts of the case did not fall within its purview.
Searles, 990 F.2d at 793.
After undertaking a thorough review of our caselaw
touching upon the underlying constitutional violation in a
Monell/Collins case, we have found language in the cases
supporting and opposing the existence of a state-created danger
theory.
cases.

Perhaps at some point we will have to harmonize our
But we have not reached that day, because even assuming

that a plaintiff can state a constitutional violation based on

the state-created danger theory, there can be no liability in
this case.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
concluded that in order to prove liability under the state
created danger theory, "the environment created by the state
actors must be dangerous; they must know it to be dangerous; and
. . . they must have used their authority to create an
opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third
party's crime to occur.

Put otherwise, the defendants must have

been at least deliberately indifferent to the plight of the
plaintiff."

Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d at

201.12
Our review of the cases supports these observations.
For instance, in Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 341 (1990), a state
trooper, after arresting the driver of a car and impounding the
car, left the driver's female passenger stranded alone in a
neighborhood with the highest aggravated crime rate in the county
at 2:30 A.M.

The plaintiff was raped.

The court held that the

plaintiff "has raised a genuine issue of fact tending to show
that [the trooper] acted with deliberate indifference to
[plaintiff's] interest in personal security under the fourteenth
amendment."

Id. at 588.

In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,

880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066, 110

12

. In that case, the Court of Appeals declined to decide
whether such a theory is viable.

S.Ct. 1784 (1990), the state allowed a prisoner with a history of
committing violent crimes to participate in a work release
program where he had access to "axes, picks, machetes, knives and
saws," and was supervised only by an unarmed civilian member of
the community.

The inmate abducted the town clerk at knife point

and held her hostage for three days, during which time he
threatened to abuse her sexually and physically and to kill her.
Id. at 350.
Cases like these have four things in common:

(1) the

harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the
plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship between the state
and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority to
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for
the third party's crime to occur.

Thus, in Brown v. Grabowski we

pointed out that in Wood, the plaintiff and state actors had
"more than fleeting and merely prefatory . . . contact."
922 F.2d at 1116.

Brown,

Similarly, Brown noted that "[i]n Cornelius,

the plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendants who
employed her exercised a control over her work environment that
arguably was sufficient to create a special, quasi-custodial
relationship between them."

Brown, 922 F.2d at 1115.

Accordingly, in Brown we emphasized that cases applying the
theory focused on the fact that a relationship existed between
the state and the plaintiff, under which the state qua state
placed the plaintiff in danger of a foreseeable injury.

The cases where the state-created danger theory was
applied were based on discrete, grossly reckless acts committed
by the state or state actors using their peculiar positions as
state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to
foreseeable injury.

In Wood, for example, the woman eventually

was raped, and the court held that a jury could find that the
officer, using his power as an officer, placed the plaintiff in a
situation entailing a foreseeable risk of danger.

Indeed,

assuming the facts are true, it would be unfair to say that the
state actor was not responsible for the rape.
But this case is not like those cases at all.

When the

alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at the public at large
-- namely a failure to protect the public by failing adequately
to screen applicants for membership in a volunteer fire company - the rationale behind the rule disappears -- there can be no
specific knowledge by the defendant of the particular plaintiff's
condition, and there is no relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff.

Therefore, we cannot say that an oppressive act

of the defendants, made possible by virtue of the fact that they
were acting in a public capacity, caused Mark's injury.13
13

. Nor, for the reasons discussed above, and discussed below in
our "deliberate indifference" section, can we say that
Enterprise's and the Borough's actions in failing
psychologically to screen applicants shocks the conscience and
therefore that the policy itself caused the harm. In this
regard, we note that there is some inconsistency in our circuit
as to the standard governing the underlying constitutional
violation in policy, custom or practice cases. Collins, in
assessing whether the plaintiff had established a constitutional
violation predicate to municipal liability, asked first whether
she had established a duty, and second whether the defendant's
actions shocked the conscience. In Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22

We conclude, therefore, that Mark has failed to
demonstrate that he was deprived of a constitutional right.
Consequently, neither Enterprise nor the Borough can be liable in
this case.

C.

Were defendants deliberately indifferent?

(..continued)
F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc), we interpreted Collins to
mean that in all substantive due process cases, the appropriate
constitutional test is whether the defendant's actions shock the
conscience. But in Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d
Cir. 1994) (panel opinion), in articulating the constitutional
standard for municipal liability, we said:
[I]n a substantive due process case arising
out of a police pursuit, an underlying
constitutional tort can still exist even if
no individual police officer violated the
Constitution. . . . The pursuing police
officers are liable under section 1983 if
their conduct 'shocks the conscience.' The
City is liable under section 1983 if its
policymakers, acting with deliberate
indifference, implemented a policy of
inadequate training and thereby caused the
officers to conduct the pursuit in an unsafe
manner and deprive the plaintiffs of life or
liberty.
Id. at 1292 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Therefore, the
Fagan panel opinion appeared to hold that a plaintiff can
establish a constitutional violation predicate to a claim of
municipal liability simply by demonstrating that the
policymakers, acting with deliberate indifference, enacted an
inadequate policy that caused an injury. It appears that, by
focusing almost exclusively on the "deliberate indifference"
prong of the Collins test, the panel opinion did not apply the
first prong -- establishing an underlying constitutional
violation. At any rate, as discussed in detail in the text, we
believe that the defendants' actions and omissions not only fail
to shock the conscience, but cannot be characterized as
deliberately indifferent.

Notwithstanding our foregoing conclusion, we will
assume that Mark was deprived of a constitutional right.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the defendants cannot be
responsible for his losses even though Mark asserts that they
were deliberately indifferent in failing to establish and impose
prudent membership screening requirements.

In City of Canton v.

Harris, the Court discussed the meaning of the deliberate
indifference standard:
It may seem contrary to common sense to
assert that a municipality will actually have
a policy of not taking reasonable steps to
train its employees. But it may happen that
in light of the duties assigned to specific
officers or employees the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be
said to have been deliberately indifferent to
the need. In that event, the failure to
provide proper training may fairly be said to
represent a policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which the city may be
held liable if it actually causes injury.
489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. at 1205.

As an example, the Court

noted that it may be obvious that when the city has armed its
police officers with firearms, and the city knows the officers
will be required to arrest fleeing felons, "the need to train
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly
force can be said to be 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could
properly be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to
constitutional rights."

Id. at n.10.

Mark's evidence that the defendants' failure to screen
applicants psychologically for tendencies toward arson amounts to
deliberate indifference consists of the following:

Joseph

Reading of Enterprise and others representing Enterprise and the
Borough, testified that arsonists pose a greater danger to the
community when members of fire departments, see app. 417, and
that in recent years there have been a number of instances in
which volunteer firemen, though not members of Enterprise, set
fires.

App. 447.

Mark also includes a series of expert reports

tending to show that Marley exhibited a "thrill seeking"
personality and a history of alcohol and drug abuse and that
therefore he should not have been made a member of the fire
department.

According to Mark's evidence, Marley appeared

visibly drunk at fires.

Third, Mark has attached a series of

newspaper articles demonstrating the risk of volunteer
firefighters committing fires.

Finally, Mark submitted a report

from George E. Friedell, Deputy Chief (Retired) of the New York
City Fire Department and Assistant Professor of Fire Science at
City University of New York, stating that "physical and mental
capabilities of applicants and members should be tested at levels
commensurate with the duties of a fire fighter."

App. 993.

The

report points out that "[i]t is well known that certain arsonists
set fires either for the thrill of watching the fire or the
thrill of participating in extinguishing the fire."

Id.

Moreover, "[i]t is well known that virtually all professional and
many volunteer fire companies have adopted a policy of doing
psychological testing and background investigation of applicants

and of members suspected of having problems and that, where such
testing is performed, arson fires by fire fighters have been
reduced essentially to zero."

Id. at 995.

But the report provides no statistical evidence that
psychological testing substantially has reduced such arsons.
Consequently, we are asked to take Friedell's word for it.

In

any event, even if we do so, Enterprise did have a screening
procedure -- the state police performed a background check on
each applicant at Enterprise's expense.

And, prior to the Marley

fire, Enterprise's firefighters had not committed a single arson
in the past 100 years.14

Thus, any allegation that the need for

psychological screening was "obvious" would have to measure the
extent to which psychological screening provides a better
benchmark for discovering potential arsonists than the police
background check Enterprise already employed.

We cannot say on

the record before us that psychological testing provides such a
better method of screening that a failure to use it can be held
to evince deliberate indifference to members of the community.
14

. While a "policy which ordered or authorized an
unconstitutional act can be established by a single decision by
proper municipal policymakers", see Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300 n.11
(1986), the fact that only a single unconstitutional act is
alleged can support a conclusion that the act was not caused by a
policy, see id. (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24, 105 S.Ct. at
2436), or that the need for heightened training or screening was
not obvious. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. at
1205 n.10 ("It could also be that the police, in exercising their
discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need
for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city
policymakers, who, nevertheless, are 'deliberately indifferent'
to the need.").

In reaching our conclusions, we accept the proposition
that psychological screening would tell more about a person's
background than a state police background check -- including
characteristics that are compatible with the characteristics of
arsonists.

Yet such screening in itself can lead to difficulties

as it may exclude too many people and perhaps be constitutionally
deficient in that way.

Thus, if we held that Mark could survive

the motions for summary judgment because at trial the trier of
the fact might conclude that there should have been psychological
screening, we effectively might be requiring volunteer fire
companies to initiate a process which in other cases will expose
it to liability by reason of having excluded an applicant from
membership.

In this regard, we point out that we have held that

Enterprise is a public actor.
Moreover, an overbroad screening process, even if not
leading to lawsuits by excluding applicants, could infringe on
their privacy rights.

In fact, Reading testified that Enterprise

stopped having a background check performed by local police
because "the right to privacy came in . . . ."

App. 412.

Cf.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. at 1007 ("In defense of [the
county workers] it must also be said that had they moved too soon
to take custody of the son away from the father, they would
likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into
the parent-child relationship.").

The totality of these

circumstances establishes that the record cannot support a
conclusion that Enterprise was deliberately indifferent with

respect to screening applicants.

The most that can be said is

that in some persons' views there was a better way to screen.15

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) Enterprise
is a state actor; (2) there was no underlying constitutional
violation in this case for which the defendants can be held
responsible; (3) even if liability could attach, it may not be
imposed in this case because the defendants did not enact a
policy evincing willful disregard or deliberate indifference to
plaintiff's rights.

Therefore, for all the reasons detailed

above, we will affirm the order for summary judgment of June 30,
1994.

15

. We hasten to add that we are not holding that screening is
necessary, as that issue is not before us since Enterprise did
screen applicants.

Mark v. Hatboro, No. 94-1722
Greenberg, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I write separately in this case because I believe
Edmonson should be read to alter the interpretive landscape for
all state action inquiries into whether a private actor should be
considered a state actor for a particular action or course of
conduct.

I believe that the discrete test approach did not

survive Edmonson.
I.
As the majority opinion notes, the Edmonson Court
described the state action doctrine as follows:
Our precedents establish that, in determining
whether a particular action or course of
conduct is governmental in character, it is
relevant to examine the following: the
extent to which the actor relies on
governmental assistance and benefits, see
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961); whether the
actor is performing a traditional
governmental function, see Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946);
cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S.
522, 544-45, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (1987);
and whether the injury caused is aggravated
in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority, see Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22, 111
S.Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).

Yet the majority concludes that this

language applies only to one of the discrete state action
inquiries, and assumes that the entire panoply of discrete tests

survived Edmonson.

I recognize that a number of courts have,

like the district court and majority opinion in this case,
continued to apply the discrete test approach.

See, e.g., United

Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 906 (4th
Cir. 1995); Sherman v. Community Consolidated Sch. Dist., 8 F.3d
1160, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1993); Haavistola v. Community Fire Co.,
6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993); Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980
F.2d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114
S.Ct. 79 (1993); Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F. Supp.
1531, 1540 (D. Wyo. 1993).

And because prior precedents of this

Court similarly have ruled, I wrote the majority opinion that
way.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, No. 94-5200 (3d Cir. Feb.

16, 1995).
But I believe that interpretation is wrong.

In the

first place, as the Supreme Court itself has pointed out, it
never has been clear "[w]hether these different tests are
actually different in operation or simply different ways of
characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts
the Court in [each] situation".

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457

U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755 (1982).

Thus, to say that

there are no discrete tests is not saying anything new or
radical.

And, as is apparent by the description and application

of the various scenarios in the majority opinion, utilization of
the discrete test approach has created nothing short of an
analytical muddle.

For one thing, the discrete tests collapse

into each other and overlap significantly.

See 2 Ronald D.

Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 16.4 at
554-55 (2d ed. 1992).

Moreover, "[u]nfortunately, [the Supreme

Court] cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of
the state have not been a model of consistency."

Edmonson, 500

U.S. at 632, 111 S.Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) and
therefore it is unclear when and whether to apply particular
tests.

See also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115

S.Ct. 961, 964 (1995) (quoting Justice O'Connor).

Further still,

what is the use of having a strict "exclusive government function
test" if an action otherwise deemed private under that test can
become public under the "symbiotic relationship" test.

Finally,

the discrete test approach forced courts into pursuits of the
viability of one or another test, rather than into an inquiry of
whether under the facts of a particular case, there had been
"state action."

See, e.g., Majority Typescript at 14 n.6

(discussing question of whether symbiotic relationship test
remains viable).
In my view, Edmonson provided a way out of the muddle,
and we should take it.

Rather than stating a series of discrete

tests and applying them separately to determine whether each by
itself is satisfied, the Court considered a number of factors,
and weighed them to determine whether, all things considered, the
otherwise private actor fairly could be deemed to be a state
actor.

Under that new framework, courts should consider the

principles furthered by the previous tests as part of a single
balancing and weighing approach.

And it should apply to all

cases involving the question of whether a private actor is
engaged in state action.
The state action confusion certainly stemmed in part
from the fact that the Court created what appeared to be discrete
tests but then utilized them to address particular factual
scenarios.

See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,

722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860 (1961) (courts must determine whether
there is state action by "sifting facts and weighing
circumstances").

Thus, the courts applied the different

formulations on an ad-hoc basis to determine whether a party is
attempting to hold the state or entity liable based on private
actions "for which they cannot fairly be blamed."
U.S. at 936-37, 102 S.Ct. at 2753.

Lugar, 457

I believe the Edmonson

language takes us full circle back to those principles and
provides us a way out of the muddle by mandating that we apply a
different -- and better and more flexible -- framework than the
prior cases.

II.
Edmonson's discussion of the public function test
further supports my conclusion that it set forth a new framework
for deciding state-action issues.

As noted above, prior to

Edmonson, in order to constitute state action under the public

function test, the action had to be traditionally within the
exclusive prerogative of the state.

But in Edmonson, the Court

inquired only whether "the action in question involves the
performance of a traditional function of the government."
Edmonson, id. at 624, 111 S.Ct. at 2085.

It appears that the

Court intentionally deleted the exclusivity requirement for
Justice O'Connor's dissent suggested that the majority had
"misstated the law" by holding that "state action may be imputed
to one who carries out a 'traditional governmental function.'"
Id. at 639, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
dissent continued:

The

"In order to constitute state action under

[the public function] doctrine, private conduct must not only
comprise something that the government traditionally does, but
something that only the government traditionally does."

Id. at

640, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). In other words,
Edmonson seems consciously to have eliminated the "exclusivity"
requirement from the public function inquiry.16

See also

McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Ed., 24 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in

16

. Judge Sarokin concurs that in Edmonson the Supreme Court
deleted the "exclusivity" requirement from the public function
inquiry. He concludes, however, in accordance with this
concurring opinion that we are bound by the contrary holdings in
Black, McKeesport, and Groman. See concurring opinion typescript
at 2.

judgment) ("Edmonson . . . seemed to eliminate the 'exclusivity'
requirement of the public function test for state action.").17
17

. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in analyzing
the effect of Edmonson, held that "exclusivity" still is part of
the public function test. It reasoned as follows:
[W]e do not believe the Supreme Court would
have attempted to change radically the
government function standard set forth in
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, and thereafter
applied consistently in Flagg Bros., 436 U.S.
at 157-58, Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842,
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005, 1011-12
(1982), [San Francisco Arts & Athletics v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
544-45 (1987)], and NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 197-98 n.18 (1988), through the
transparent puerilism of simple omission. If
it had intended to change the law in this
respect, we believe it would have said so
explicitly. Moreover, the ultimate reasoning
of the Court in Edmonson was that juror
selection was traditionally an exclusive
governmental function. See, e.g., Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 627 ("The selection of jurors
represents a unique governmental function
delegated to private litigants by the
government and attributable to the government
. . . ." (emphasis added)).
United Auto Workers, 43 F.3d at 906 n.2. While the United Auto
Workers court's point is well taken, its rationale is based on a
premise I reject -- that the public function test necessarily
remains, in and of itself, a method of imposing state actor
status. As discussed in the text, infra, I agree that the
Supreme Court would not simultaneously have retained the public
function test yet deleted the exclusivity requirement. That
would be a breathtaking expansion of the state action doctrine.
But it does make sense to delete the "exclusivity" requirement
and use the public function concept as part of a broader state
action inquiry. Thus, in my reading of Edmonson, it does not
constitute such a radical change in the law that an explicit
statement that "we abandon the exclusivity requirement" is
required. After all, other than exclusivity, all the other

But, if Justice O'Connor's conclusion was correct -that under the majority's analysis state action could be found
simply from the fact that the challenged action occurred within a
"traditional government function," the Court would have widened
significantly the category of "public functions."

After all,

"many functions have been traditionally performed by
governments."

Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158, 98

S.Ct. 1729, 1734 (1978).

Yet, if the three-test approach, under

which satisfaction of one of the discrete tests is enough, is the
only approach after Edmonson, then the Court in Edmonson would in
fact have expanded greatly the circumstances in which there had
been state action and the possibility of section 1983 liability.
I doubt that the Court intended that result and thus Edmonson is
best understood if it is recognized that an inquiry into whether
a private party performs a public function merely is one
important factor to consider in determining whether state action
exists.18
(..continued)
components of the public function test delineated in the prior
caselaw, such as that "receipt of public funds and the
performance of a function serving the public alone are not enough
to make a private entity a state actor," see Groman v. Township
of Manalapan, No. 94-5200, slip op. at 21 (3d Cir. Feb. 16,
1995), remain part of the test.
18

. It is true, as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently pointed out, that in Edmonson, the Supreme Court
described jury selection as a unique governmental function.
United Auto Workers, 43 F.3d at 906 n.2. But if "unique" is to
be equated with "exclusive" under the discrete test approach, the
Court could have stopped at that point. It did not; rather, the
Court went on to consider other factors as well.

In my reading, then, the three tests no longer (if they
ever did) constitute discrete, dispositive tests to the exclusion
of a broader approach.

Instead, a court should consider the

principles embodied in those tests in determining whether it is
fair to find state action in a particular case.

Thus, the fact

that the action constituted a traditional governmental function,
while certainly relevant, does not in itself necessarily mean
there has been state action.

Rather, a court generally should go

on to consider other relevant factors.

